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How RANDOM AND SUSPICIONLESS MAY SCHOOL
SEARCHES BE?: DOVBTINGJOYV. PENN-HARRISMADISON SCHOOL CORPORATION

I. INTRODUCTION
School districts' responses to the problems posed by student
drug use place difficulties and limitations on the ability of
individual schools to educate children. 1 Recently, random
suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in
specific activities has gained popularity. This drug testing
procedure has raised concerns about the potential for violation
of students' Fourth Amendment rights. 2 Such concerns
justifiably stem from the expansion of schools' abilities to
violate student privacy rights.
The legal disputes in this area never harp upon whether a
student may be searched or drug tested by the school, or if the
school has probable cause based upon individual suspicion, or if
the school has obtained a warrant. The cases that follow similarly do not argue the permissibility of schools' drug testing
students based on individualized suspicion alone. Rather, the
issue presented in these cases is whether students may be classified for the purpose of drug testing by the types of activities
they participate in at school, without either suspicion of individual illegal conduct or probable cause. In other words, is it
permissible for schools to test students for drug use based
solely upon the fact that they participate in extra-curricular activities?

1. Charles J. Russo & David L. Gregory, Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding
Drug Testing in Schools, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 611 (citing studies done
about levels of drug use).
2. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S.
CaNST. amend IV.
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In the recent case of Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School
3
Corporation, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of
whether or not the Supreme Court's tests espoused in New Jer4
5
sey v. T.L.0. and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton were
properly used in the school's decision to use random suspicionless drug testing of student drivers and others who participated in non-athletic extra-curricular activities.
In Joy, the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by several students who sued their school district for due process violations. The school had enacted a random drug, alcohol, and
nicotine testing policy for all students who participated in extracurricular activities, drove to school, volunteered to be part
of the random pool, were suspended from the school for three
consecutive days before they could come back to classes, and all
students for whom there was a reasonable suspicion of being
under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Joy and the other
plaintiffs attacked the merits of the first two grounds: students
who participate in non-athletic extra-curricular activities and
students who drive to school.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Joy was particularly notable in that it departed from established policy. The court upheld the school's suspicionless drug testing policy even though
the school district failed to meet the test laid out by the Supreme Court, it had a poorly outlined policy, and its counsel
admitted that his goal was to require all high-school students
to undergo suspicionless drug testing. Had it not been for
precedent set by the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in
6
Todd v. Rush County Schools, the panel stated it would have
invalidated the school district's policy because it violated stu7
dents' Fourth Amendment rights.
This paper will explore the questions surrounding the Joy
decision and examine the background and analytical framework that made the decision in upholding random suspicionless
drug testing possible. To accomplish this task, this paper will
analyze precedent set by the Supreme Court's and the Seventh
Circuit's legal decisions and show how they have consistently
held that students' rights under the Fourth Amendment are
3.
4.
5.
6.

212
469
515
133

F.3d
U.S.
U.S.
F.3d

1052 (7'" Cir. 2000).
325 (1985).
646 (1995).
984 (7'" Cir. 1998).
7. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1066.
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limited. This paper will then examine some of the underlying
policy considerations behind these decisions, namely the impact of random drug testing upon the value of extra-curricular
activities, the effects of these decisions upon the police powers
of school districts, and whether the justification of protecting
student health and welfare is sufficient for intruding upon student privacy. Finally, this paper will examine how a school district would properly implement a constitutional suspicionless,
random drug-testing program.

II.

BACKGROUND

Joy relied primarily upon two Supreme Court cases, New
9
8
Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, as
well as two previous Seventh Circuit cases for its decision.
Since Joy relied upon these cases in its determination to uphold the school's drug testing policy, it is useful to review the
tests proffered by the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
in determining whether a school district has appropriately applied the Fourth Amendment to its student drug-testing policies.

A.

Supreme Court Cases Dealing with the Fourth Amendment
Rights of Public School Students

1. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
The first case dealing with the rights of school districts to
search students for drugs came in the 1985 case, New Jersey v.
10
T.£.0. This case arose when a female student who had been
caught smoking in a bathroom had her purse searched by the
assistant principal after she flatly denied smoking. The assistant principal found not only a pack of cigarettes, but also rolling papers, a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, several empty
plastic bags, cash, a list of students who owed her money for
marijuana, and two letters implicating her in drug dealing. After the police and her mother were called, the student, T.L.O.,
11
admitted to having dealt drugs.
8.
9.
10.
11.

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
See id.
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The Supreme Court had to decide whether "the exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school
12
official without the involvement of law enforcement officers."
The majority's decision held that for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the assistant principal conducted a reasonable
search. The majority reached this conclusion based upon a balancing test between the school's interest in a drug-free learning
13
environment and the student's interest in privacy. The Court
emphasized that in certain cases a search may be conducted
without a warrant and that probable cause was not the only
14
standard for an official of the state to conduct a search. The
majority even acknowledged that although the Fourth
Amendment applies as a restraint of governmental intrusion
upon students' rights, a "special needs" exception exists when it
is determined that individual suspicion and probable cause are
15
impracticable. The Court further explained that since the
government has an obligation to fulfill the purposes of educa16
tion, the need to instill discipline among the students is more
pressing than ever. Widespread drug use has made it much
17
more difficult for school districts to discipline their students.
Hence, the "special needs" exception requires schools to have
the ability to use reasonable flexibility in determining when it
is appropriate to search students under the Fourth Amend18
ment. On one side of the equation, schools find it necessary to
exercise their police power in maintaining stability and order,

12. Id. at 331.
13. ld. at 343.
14. See id. at 337. The court dictated the rule: "on one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and personal security; on the
other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order." ld.
15. See id.
16. !d. at 334. The Court stated "[t]hat they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." !d.
17. ld. at 340 (" ... maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.").
18. See id. "It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject." As such, the
court is hesitant to create rules which would, "unduly interfere with the maintenance
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
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whereas on the other side of the equation, students expect to
maintain their privacy. The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not protect a person's unreasonable or illegitimate expectations of privacy. The test balances the governmental and privacy interests in cases where the practicality of
the warrant and probable cause requirements are in the particular context.
The Court rejected two of New Jersey's arguments: first,
that a student in public schools was more akin to a prisoner
and second, that he or she had no need to bring personal belongings to school. It did, however, hold that the reasonable expectation of student privacy was diminished in the public
school setting. The rule in T.L.O. was that school officials could
justify a search of a student upon reasonable and individualized suspicion "that the search [would] turn up evidence that
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
19
rules of the school."
Justice Stevens' vigorous dissent stated that students in a
governmental institution deserved more than a reasonableness
test to determine whether they could be searched for violation
20
of school rules. Unlike the majority, Stevens did not distinguish between students in public schools and the general public
at large. Stevens argued that, despite whatever test the majority proposed, "[t]he search of a young woman's purse by a
school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate ex21
pectations of privacy." He stated, "[m]oved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials - perhaps even
supported by a majority of citizens - may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on
the principle that a true balance between the individual and
society depends on the recognition of 'the right to be let
2
alone ... "'
Stevens felt that the problem with the majority's balancing
test was that the difficulties experienced in securing a warrant
"[are] not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's
19. ld. at 342.
20. See id. at 354. The sanction of "school officials to conduct full-scale searches
on a 'reasonableness' standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same
test as the 'probable cause' standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment." I d.
21. ld. at 375.
22. ld. at 361-62 (footnote omitted).
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protection of privacy; rather, [they are] the ver;y purpose for
2
which the Amendment was thought necessary." " Stevens further contended that the use of a balancing test in determining
the limits of Fourth Amendment rights "finds support neither
in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous weakening of
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy
24
and security of our citizens." He expostulated that the majority's balancing test was essentially a form of cost-benefit analy2
sis not contemplated by the Constitution. fi Thus, he felt the
majority overstated the social costs faced by the government
while under-weighing the need for Fourth Amendment protec2c
tion by students. ' Stevens finally concluded that the probable
27
cause standard should be upheld even for students.
2. Vernonia: U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Vernonia continued where T.L.O. left off by applying "special needs" testing to the area of random drug testing of student athletes. The Vernonia school district was at a loss as to
what to do regarding an entrenched drug problem led by the
student athletes. School district officials anecdotally had noticed that the number of students using drugs had risen significantly, that discipline had become worse, and that profane
language had become common during the 1980s. After a series
of injuries involving athletes suspected of drug use, the district
decided to actively respond to the problem through "special
classes, speakers, and presentations designed to deter drug
28
use." When this initial program failed, the district, after presentations to the parents, implemented a "Student Athlete Drug
Policy." This policy, which involved drug testing student athletes only, had the express purpose of "prevent[ing] student
23. !d. at 357.
24. !d. at 358.
25. See id. at 362-69 (wherein Justice Stevens extensively discusses the flexibility, in terms of"costs," etc., for which this rule provides).
26. !d. at 362.
27. See id at 361
"Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that no search may be
conducted where the official is not in possession of probable cause that is, where the official does not know of 'facts and circumstances
[thatl warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been
committed."' (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S., at 102 (1959)).
28. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
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athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety,
29
and to provide drug users with assistance programs."
All students wishing to participate on any athletic team
were required to have their parents sign a consent form permitting drug testing. The policy mandated drug testing of all
athletes at the beginning of the season. The students' names
were subsequently placed into a pool from which a student,
with two adults, would draw the names of ten percent of the
athletes, who would be drug tested that day. The tests were
administered in the locker rooms and students were searched
specifically for controlled substances. If a student tested positive, a second test was taken; if the second test were negative,
then no further action would be taken. However, if the test was
again positive, the athletes' parents would be notified and the
student would be given the choice of participating in a six-week
drug assistance program or being suspended for the remainder
of the season. A second offense would automatically suspend
the student from playing sports for the rest of the season. A
third offense would suspend the athlete from the rest of the
30
present season and the next two athletic seasons.
The Court initially explained that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted to protect the citizenry of the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures/n which en12
compassed drug testing in schools.: The Court, however, qualified this by stating that a person's Fourth Amendment rights
are not absolute; rather, "the ultimate measure of the constitu33
tionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness."' The
Court acknowledged that judicial warrant and probable cause
are generally required when the government conducts a search
but that some instances warranted exception. The Court determined, because of its holding in T.L. 0., that public schools
fell into the category of "special needs" cases. Thus, under the
"special needs" doctrine the government does not require a
warrant to perform a search. Hence, the Court developed a balancing test where it engaged in "balancing ... between the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" and

29. !d. at 650.
30. See id. at 651.
31. See id. at 652.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 652.
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the search's promotion oflegitimate governmental interests.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court went on to enumerate a
four-prong test as a guide in determining whether or not the
government could reasonably conduct a search without a warrant. First, the Court said that the nature of the privacy interest must be examined. The Court stated that since minors are
in the custody of the school, they are limited in their privacy
interests in general, and that athletes, in particular, have a
limited privacy interest because "there is 'an element of com35
munal undress' inherent in athletic participation." Secondly,
the court reasoned, the government must determine the character of the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest. Here,
since the drug testing process was "nearly identical to conditions encountered in public restrooms," the Court concluded
that the impairment of student's privacy rights was reasonable.36 This view was bolstered by the fact that the information
was "not disclosed to law enforcement personnel and was provided to only a limited number of school personnel.":l7 The
Court stated that the third prong was the nature of the governmental concern at issue. As the Court in Vernonia pointed
out: "deterring drug use by schoolchildren was obviously impor-

34. !d. at 653. See also Joy, 212 F.3d at 1058-59 (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (1988)).
35. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. This characterization presents its own troubling legal question: does the fact that a school provides only 'communal' changing facilities determine that the Fourth Amendment privacy protections have lost some of
their meaning? What if schools paid for locker rooms with private or semi-private lockers? Would those student athletes have the same problems as Vernonia? It seems that
this justification is a weak one. One commentator has noted that this concept of a lower
expectation of privacy for students participating in extracurricular activities is not universally accepted.
Certainly there is no remarkable element of communal undress present for participants in the Library Club or Future Farmers of America. The Court of Appeals comes distressingly close to authorizing
blanket, random, suspicionless searches of all public school students
based upon the lesser expectation of privacy held by students in general. J. Nathan Jensen, Note, Don't Rush to Abandon a SuspicionBased Standard for Searches o{Public School Students, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 695 (2000).
36. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059. It would seem that there is a difference between urinating without anyone monitoring your behavior and the scrutiny that one's behavior
is under during urinalysis. It appears again that the court is stretching. Although the
situation is the same, the context is very different. Further, the courts do not consider
a legal privacy interest in one's biological byproducts, perhaps because these cases fall
under the "special needs" exception.
37. !d. at 1059.
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tant, especially given that school years are the time when the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most
38
severe." The Court stated that drug use by students affects
the whole student body because it disrupts the educational
39
process. The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts required that the school district show a "compelling need" for the
drug testing in order to eliminate the requirement of individu40
alized suspicion of students. This was met, however, because
the government was able to show that its interest was "important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive
41
upon a genuine expectation of privacy." The Court stated the
fourth prong was the immediacy of the concern. It concluded
that "this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by
school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to
the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is par42
ticularly high." The Vernonia court highlighted evidence
showing that drug use negatively impacts student athletes in
several ways, namely through "impairment of judgment, slow
reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain." There
were additionally physical risks of drugs to athletes, such as
"'artificially induced heart rate increase . . . [b]lood pressure
43
increase and [m]asking of the normal fatigue response."'
Based upon examination of these four prongs, the Court held
that all the government needed was substantial reasonableness
before it could randomly drug test student athletes without
susp1c10n.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
did not agree with the majority's elaborate balancing test. In
her dissent, she mused that "the millions ofthese students who
participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority
of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to
suspect the_x use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bod4
ily search."
She argued that suspicionless drug testing was not justified
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1060.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
!d. (emphasis added).
!d. at 662.
ld.
!d. at 667.

352

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

on the facts because it was not clear that a suspicion-based regime would not work. She criticized the majority's reasonableness test, stating that it "treats a suspicion-based regime as if
it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative-that
is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion ... is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability."45 She felt that reasonableness should mean reasonable
suspicion, rather than some sort of balancing. This should be
especially true since the Court never discussed whether a suspicion-based program is practical. The Fourth Amendment
places a limitation, enacting a price on government's ability to
monitor the behavior of its citizens even in situations involving
a compelling government interest like fighting drugs, which is
46
traditionally not part of a school's function.
O'Connor went further, stating that the majority's decision
effectively espoused a policy allowing for blanket searches of
47
students. She felt that the decision was fundamentally unconstitutional because it could undermine the very nature of the
Fourth Amendment. "Blanket searches, because they can involve 'thousands or millions' of searches, 'pos[e] a greater
threat to liberty' than do suspicion-based ones, which 'affec[tJ
48
one person at a time."' Judges should not be in the business of
determining what has, up until Vernonia, been "generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
49
Amendment." A reasonableness test violates the Framers'
hard-fought battle to contain the ability of government to generally search its citizens, individuals as well as groups.
O'Connor suggested, instead, an alternative procedure that
would address the school district's need for a policy that combats drugs and still maintains the individual suspicion reso
quirement. She suggested that the school should focus drug-

45. /d. at 676.
46. See id. at 680.
47. /d. at 681. The instant case, however, asks whether the Fourth Amendment is
even more lenient than that, i.e., whether it is so lenient that students may be deprived
of the Fourth Amendment's only remaining, and most basic, categorical protection: its
strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying
antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly innocent people.
48. /d. at 667 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987)).
49. /d.
50. See id. Others disagree with this sentiment arguing that it would undermine
the effectiveness of the school to deter drug use. These commentators fail to ask
whether society wants to promote effectiveness; See also John J. Bursch, Note, The 4
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testing on students who violate rules against severe disruption
on and around campuses. This policy would accomplish two
things: it would limit the number of students tested and would
give students control, through their behavior, over the likeli51
hood that they would be tested. This ensures that only those
who violate specific rules will be drug tested.
O'Connor further challenged the majority's test itself by refuting its justification for implementing the test. She remarked, "certainly monitored urination combined with urine
testing is more intrusive than some personal searches we have
52
said trigger Fourth Amendment protections in the past." She
additionally found the Court's reliance upon physical examinations and vaccinations as poor justification for its holding because neither physical examinations nor vaccinations are
searches under the Fourth Amendment. She stated, "[p]hysical
exams (and of course vaccinations) are not searches for conditions that reflect wrongdoing on the part of the student, and so
are wholly nonaccusator:y and have no consequences that can
3
be regarded as punitive.w' Additionally (and similar to T.L. 0. ),
O'Connor pointed out that the majority overstated governmental concern of a suspicion-based program, commenting that the
district seems to have understated the extent to which such a
54
program is less intrusive of students' privacy." Finally,
O'Connor echoed Steven's dissent in T.L.O. by concluding, "[i]t
cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our con55
stitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."

B. Seventh Circuit Cases
1. Athletes and Cheerleaders

Before Vernonia was decided, the Seventh Circuit had already determined that school districts may randomly drug test
R's of Drug Testing in Public School: Random Is Reasonable and Rights are Reduced,
80 MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1996).
51. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 685.
52. Id. at 672 (See Cup v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
53. ld. at 683.
54. !d. at 678.
55. !d. at 686. "But we must also stay mindful that not all government responses
to such times are hysterical overreactions; some crises are quite real, and when they
are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that we have said may justify
a measured intrusion on constitutional rights." ld.
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student athletes and cheerleaders in Schaill v. Tippecanoe
56
County School Corp. In Schaill, the baseball coach had received information that several of the players on the team were
using drugs. He ordered that his team undergo drug testing
and found that five of the sixteen players tested positive for
57
marijuana use. These results led the school board to "institute
a random urine testing program for interscholastic athletes
58
and cheerleaders in the TSC school system." The program required a signed consent form by both the student and one parent. If the student made the team, each athlete was assigned a
number that was placed in a box. At different times during the
season, the administrator would select a number from the box
59
and the person chosen would be tested. The student was
taken to the restroom, and was allowed to fill the cup without
visual monitoring. Certain checks ensured that the sample was
60
authentic.
Litigation ensued when two students refused to participate
in the schools' random urinalysis program, claiming that the
test violated their Fourth Amendment due process rights. 61 The
district court denied their claims for declaratory and injunctive
62
relief.
The circuit panel determined that urinalysis testing was a
Fourth Amendment search and that a ~erson had a reasonable
expectation of privacy when urinating. ·a The court determined
that the school could not contract away a person's constitu64
tional rights that it could not command directly. Thus, the
56. 864 F.2d 1309 (7"' Cir. 1988).
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1311.
60. See id. If the student tested positive for drugs, they could have the remaining
sample tested at the lab of their choice. Barring any innocent explanations, the school
would suspend the student from participating in 30% of the varsity events for the remainder of the season. A second positive result would keep the player from participating in 50% of the varsity events for a remainder of the season. A third positive result
would suspend the student from playing varsity sports for a full calendar year, while a
fourth one would eliminate the student from playing on any sport team while they
were in high school. Id.
61. See id. at 1310.
62. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County. Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind.
1988).
63. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1312. The court went on to say that society discusses such
matters in only the most euphemistic forms, further indicating the general sense of
privacy surrounding the act of urination.
64. See id. at 1312-13.
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school's requirement that a student have a signed consent form
before they could volunteer to play sports did not put the school
6
in the clear. "
The court then considered the amount of suspicion requisite
for urinalysis. Schaill argued for an individualized standard of
Go
probable cause. The court, however, relied upon the balancing
67
test used by the Supreme Court in previous cases. Since
T.L.O. stated that the warrant's probable cause requirements
68
were inapplicable and imposed a reasonableness test, the
panel relied upon that standard and refused to narrow it, feeling that a stringent Fourth Amendment analysis would "unnecessarily intrude upon the purposes of the classroom or
workplace. " ~)
The court determined that there were many reasons why
7
the school's urinalysis testing was reasonable. ° First, the invasion of privacy was diminished due to the fact that the students
were not watched during their test. Second, there was a diminished expectation of privacy respecting urinalysis for athletes
due to the "element of 'communal undress' inherent in athletic
71
participation." Third, the student-athletes were subject to
considerable regulation by the State High School Athletic Association, which, among other things, required "minimum grade,
residency and eligibility requirements ... [as well as] training
rules, including prohibitions on smoking, drinking and drug
6

65. See id.
66. See id. at 1313.
67. See id. To determine whether the government may grant a search requires
"balancfingl the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
68. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314. See also James M. McCray, Urine Trouble! Extend-

ing Constitutionality to Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students in Extracurricular Activities, 53 VAND. L. REV. 387 (arguing for the continuation and logical extension of recent decisions to include all students in public schools, and pointing out that
schools still have an in parentis right).
69. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314. The Supreme Court was concerned about requiring
teachers to master the intricacies of Fourth Amendment requirements. Instead, the
Court imposed upon teachers a duty to use the dictates of reason and common sense.
Yet, it would seem odd to think that the Bill of Rights was open to one's personal judgment, reason or common sense. This seems like a dubious standard through which one
may, in fact, have no standards.
70. The Schaill court seemed to be uncomfortable with legitimating this practice
based solely on one factor. It went on discussing, ad nauseum, why drug testing is good
and right, and even included many reasons not at issue.
71. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.

356

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

72

use both on and off school premises." The combination of
these factors meant that "students competing for positions on
an interscholastic athletic team would have strong expectations
of privacy with respect to urine tests."n

2. Extracurricular Activities and Driving
4

Todd v. Rush County Schools (Todd/ was the first Seventh
Circuit case to specifically deal with the issue of random suspicionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities.
Todd upheld the Supreme Court's rule in Vernonia, allowing a
Rush County drug-testing plan for students who drive and participate in extracurricular activities. The particular school
drug-testing policy involved here required all students who desired to participate in extracurricular activities or planned to
obtain a parking permit to consent to random drug, alcohol,
75
and tobacco testing. The school district initiated the testing
policy after the Indiana Prevention Resource Center indicated,
based upon a survey of students at the high school, that tobacco, alcohol and marijuana use was higher than average for
76
the various grades surveyed. Due to the scope of the school
district's new drug test, the policy virtually blanketed the en. sc h oo1.77
tire
The Seventh Circuit relied upon the Vernonia test and
Schaill to uphold the drug testing policy on in parentis or police

72. !d. This seems to be a false argument. The nature of grade requirements and
prohibition on the use of drugs and alcohol are one thing, using methods that violate a
student's privacy right is another. At least one commentator has claimed that Vernonia
and other decisions like Schaill permit suspicionless drug testing of all high school students and that this behavior should be encouraged. See Bursch, supra note 50 (arguing
that athletes have no need for additional protection from schools because other requirements make it akin to a heavily regulated industry).
73. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319. See also Russo & Gregory, supra note 1, at 619.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the policy because:
[I]t was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the district had sufficient procedures in place that safeguarded the rights of students. In an interesting
but realistic slant, the court also permitted testing based on its belief that since
student-athletes gain enhanced prestige in the school community, it was not unreasonable to require student athletes and cheerleaders to undergo drug testing.
[footnotes omitted].
74. 133 F.3d 984 (7"' Cir. 1998).
75. See id at 984.
76. See id at 985.
77. See id. Of the 950 students who were in the high school, 170 did not participate in extracurricular activities.
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power grounds. ~ It underscored the responsibility a school district has "as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
79
care." The court highlighted that the purpose of the drug test80
ing was to deter drug use and not to catch criminals. Unlike
previous cases, the court did not actually appear to weigh the
reasonableness of Rush County's drug testing policy; rather, it
based its decision on several general policy concerns. It held
that participation in extracurricular activities was a student
privilege and that drug testing was a cost for those who wished
81
to volunteer to participate. Second, the circuit panel held that
all extra-curricular activities were sufficiently similar to athletics and cheerleading as to render them under the same "special
82
needs" category as athletes. Third, irrespective of the student
activity, the health and welfare rationale ultimately swayed
the court: "the lynchpin of [the) drug testing program is to pro83
tect the health of the students involved." The court went further, however, by holding that students should not complain
about the drug testing because they benefit from the "enhanced
84
prestige and status in the student community." In the end,
the court decided that "if the schools are to survive and prosper, school administration must have reasonable means at
their disposal to deter conduct which substantially disrupts the
85
school environment."

Ill. ANALYSIS
A Vernonia and Todd as applied in Joy v. Penn-HarrisMadison School Corporation
The Joy court relied heavily upon precedent in making its
78. Sec id. at 986.
79. !d. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
80. Sec id.
81. Sec id.
il2. See id.
83. !d. Some take a very generous view of this rationale. However, schools have
only recently been responsible for the health and welfare for students (excepting on
certain tort liability grounds). For a different view that is more generous to this line of
thinking, see Russo & Gregory, supra note 1, at 623 ("since the board is responsible for
the welfare of its students, it was justified in requiring drug testing of all participants
in extracurricular activities.").
84. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320).
85. !d. (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324).
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decision. It noted that under the Fourth Amendment, citizens
are protected from "unreasonable searches and seizures by
86
school officials." Urinalysis is a search, and normally the government must have probable cause and a warrant unless the
87
search falls under the category of "special needs." At that
point, the balancing test between governmental interests and
the privacy interests of the parties would come into play. The
court recognized that the nature of the school's concern was
sufficiently similar to the concerns of schools in Vernonia and
88
Todd. Courts have emphasized that school districts are not
allowed to divide students into general groupings on a cate89
gory-by-category basis. Consequently, the Joy court did not
believe that Todd was mandated by Vernonia. g(t The court indicated that, had Todd not been decided less than two years prior
to Joy, "[it] would not sustain the random drug, alcohol, and
nicotine testing of students seeking to participate in extracur91
ricular activities."
When the Joy court applied the Vernonia test, it made clear
that Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation (PHM) failed to
meet the requirements for random suspicionless drug testing.
Despite this, the court upheld the district's plan (except for the
nicotine test) because of the precedent set in Todd.
The Joy court first examined the nature of the privacy interest of the students. It followed the assumption of previous
courts that students expect less privacy than the general public
because "students are in the temporary custody of the [s]chool"
92
and are subject to routine physical exams and vaccinations.
The court stated that, unlike the athletes in Vernonia and
Todd, students who "participate in extracurricular activities or
who drive to school do not subject themselves to more explicit
and routine loss of bodily privacy as a necessary component of

86. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1058 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42).
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1062. "The court cautioned against dividing students into broad
categories and drug testing on a category-by-category basis because then 'all but the
most withdrawn and uninvolved students [would] fall within a category that is subject
to testing."'
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1063. Note 9 in the decision defines "extracurricular" to mean only "nonathletic activities."
92. Id.
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their participating in the activities in question." Thus, as the
court pointed out, students in extracurricular activities have
higher expectations of privacy than athletes but less than the
general public.
The second Vernonia factor is examining the character of
the intrusion. Since the drug test in Joy was virtually identical
to the test promulgated in Vernonia, the intrusion was deemed
94
not to be overly intrusive.
The third factor examined is the nature of the governmental concern. The issue was "whether there is any correlation between the defined population and the abuse, and whether there
is any correlation between the abuse and the government's in9
terest in protecting life and property." fi The difference between
Vernonia, Todd, and Joy was that, in the first two cases, the
schools presented evidence showing that drugs were a problem
among the targeted students; whereas, the school Joy attended
had not proved, "or even attempted to prove, that a correlation
exists between drug use and those who engage in extracurricu96
lar activities or drug use and those who drive to school." The
Court admonished the school district for dividing students into
broad categories and then testing them based on those categories,97 a practice which schools had been previously warned
against by the Seventh Circuit.
The fourth Vernonia factor described the correlation between the alleged abuses and the governmental interest. While
statistics provided by PHM indicated that drug usage by students was generally higher than normal, the school district did
not explain how students involved in extra-curricular activities
were any different in their ability to perform than other students.98 PHM also failed to show that students who were in93. Id.
Although PHM students in extracurricular activities, other than
athletics, also volunteer to join a particular group and to subject
themselves to the rules of that organization, those rules do not require the same surrender of physical privacy as required of the student athletes in Vernonia. In the case of students driving to school,
the contrast is even more stark. Id.
94. See id. at 1064.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. The goal in this area of the law is that all students will eventually become subject to random drug testing in order to attend public schools, as was admitted
by the school district's attorney.
98. See id.
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valved in extra-curricular activities were in more danger than
other students. With regards to students who drove to school,
the court found it plausible that "a legitimate and pressing
need for drug and alcohol testing of students driving vehicles
on school property stems from the ability of one student under
the influence of drugs or alcohol to injure seriously another
99
student." The court, however, found that the school district
had failed to provide evidence that showed "a correlation between drug use and students in extracurricular activities, or
other evidence of a particularized special need, before implementing its suspicionless drug testing policy for those particuIoo
lar student groups."
The final factor the court examined was the efficacy of the
means. In both Vernonia, and Todd, the courts held that random suspicionless drug testing was appropriate because it was
"difficult to use individualized suspicion to drug test a broad
101
population of students, such as athletes." The Joy court emphasized that other cases have held that schools should use a
suspicion based regime of drug testing where there is no evi102
dence of a drug problem by the targeted group.
The court
said that there was no evidence to correlate drug usage and
student extracurricular activities and student drivers: "PHM
has made no showing that teachers, staff and sponsors of extracurricular activities would not be able to observe the stu10 1
dents for suspicious behavior." : Thus, PHM failed this prong
as well.
Based upon the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in
Vernonia, the circuit court held that PHM failed to properly
justif~ its random drug-testing plan for extra-curricular activi4
ties.1 Despite this sentiment, the court upheld the decision
99. /d.
100. Jd. at 1065.
101. /d.
102. See id. "In Chandler, however, the Court stressed that suspicionless drug testing without evidence of a drug problem by the targeted group should not be used if
suspicion-based drug testing is possible." (citing Chandler u. Miller, 520 U.S. 305
(1997)).
103. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1065.
104. See id. "With respect to random testing of those who participate in extracurricular activities, we believe that according to the methodology employed by the Supreme Court in Vernonia, there has been inadequate showing that such an intrusion is
justified." Also, "[T]he judges of this panel believe that students involved in extracurricular activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing as a condition of participation in the activity." /d. at 1066.
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upon precedent established in Todd: "we believe that we must
adhere to the holding in Todd and affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the School as it relates to test105
ing students involved in extracurricular activities." The court
warned counsel not to take this too far, however, and expressed
fears that schools were moving down a slippery slope in which
all students would eventually be randomly drug tested.
B. Social Policy: Implications following Joy

Although much has been written over the past few years either supporting or decrying the use of suspicionless drug testing for students, little ink has been spent examining the underlying policy factors given by courts for their decisions. It is
fairly clear that courts have relied on two primary social policy
justifications for their decisions. Since the following section of
this paper attempts to outline principles that a school board
should use in determining whether or not to engage in random
drug testing, this section will first examine what social assumptions our society is buying into in order to sacrifice student Fourth Amendment rights.
The first is the police power justification, which states that
"[b]ecause school-aged children are obligated to attend school,
the nation's school districts assume a duty to protect them
106
while at school." As phrased by one author, "[p]ublic school
students should feel and be safe at school. They should be free
from violence by other students as well as from unreasonable
invasions of privacy and regulations of individuality by school
officials. The current state of constitutional law as applied in
the school setting, however, seems to require one at the ex107
pense of the other." With their expanded role as protectors
and enforcers, school districts risk public disapproval or outcrls
1 8
when they fail to successfully address student drug problems.
105. !d. at 1066.
106. Jennifer L. Barnes, Comment, Students Under Seige? Constitutional Considerations for Public Schools Concerned with School Safety, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 621, 631
(2000).
107. !d. at 645.
108. See Michelle A. Bernstein, Comment, Constitutional Law-Massachusetts
Does Not Guarantee Fundamental Right to Education-Doe v. Superintendent of
Schools, 421 Mass. ll7, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 259-60
(1996) ("The courts have reasoned that, in most situations, a school's safety and discipline needs largely outweigh a student's individual right to education, thus suggesting
that pedagogical concerns qualify a student's right to attend school.").
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T.L. 0. first announced that the Fourth Amendment applied to
109
school officials, and the expansion of the Vernonia standard
to include students in extracurricular activities as outlined in
Todd and Joy indicate that these limits do not have much
meaning.
With the advent of suspicionless random drug testing, society has expanded the police power given to schools. This is different from the ability to suspend or evict students from school
grounds. The ability to give drug tests has heretofore been reserved for more formal enforcement structures in an environment of more significantly diminished constitutional rights. no
This is a significant enhancement of the school district's role,
power and responsibility, and carries with it the implicit threat
of even further encroachment upon students' constitutional
rights.
Another underlying social justification is the desire to promote the health and welfare of public school students. All cases
aforementioned used this as grounds for upholding the drug
testing policy. This justification is extraneous to schools' responsibility to educate, and has consequently not been argued
as a tool to avoid school district tort liability. This justification,
instead, raises the idea that schools are attempting to provide
more holistic services and to be an environment where children
are molded into upstanding adults. This is a situation where
modern social science comes into conflict with the law. It is believed that with the correct curriculum, the right incentive
packages, and the right amount of funding, school districts can
stitch up holes in other areas of students' social fabric.
As a result, schools take on the responsibility to provide
meals, before school activities, after school activities, and everything in between to help students "make it." The question
that needs to be asked is, "what are the limits of a state sponsored educational process?"m For already overburdened
schools, at some point something simply has to give. From a
policy perspective, it appears that in order for a school to function properly it must limit its primary responsibility to teaching instead of attempting to take on a full social services role.
109. See also Jensen, supra note 35.
110. I.e., a probation officer may use random suspicionless drug testing as an appropriate tool for drug offenders.
111. See Berstein, supra note 108, at 263 (discussing a recent Massachusetts case
which holds that there is no fundamental right to an education).
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In the end, schools must take on and clean up all of society's
ills, almost none of which they are responsible for. Schools have
become ground zero for resolving issues adults do not want to
deal with. When should we ask, "what is the purpose of public
education for my child?," "what role does and should my child's
school play in my child's social and cognitive development?,"
"what activities are most important for a child to participate in
when they attend elementary school, junior high and high
school?" Parents must answer these questions, as should (on a
modified basis) school board superintendents, principals, and
school boards. Teachers must examine their purpose for being
teachers.
The biggest question society should begin asking is this:
when are the marginal costs for administering a certain program in the public schools outweighed by the marginal benefits? Or more specifically, what largess currently allocated to
school activities is better suited to other governmental or private interests within the local community? While some argue
that public schools themselves should be dramatically altered,
perhaps the real problem is merely that schools have lost focus
on their primary goal: to educate youn~ people in a discrete set
11
of skills in preparation for adulthood.
If school districts feel that in order to provide a satisfactory
extra-curricular program they need to resort to random drug
testing, perhaps the time has come for a shift in policy. Instead
of remaining more concerned about school-provided extracurricular activities, they should focus their energies on whether
their students can read, write, or do arithmetic. Perhaps local
governments and school districts could formulate plans to shift
the burden of extracurricular activities from the schoolhouse to
113
a broader public sphere.

IV. WHAT Is A SCHOOL DISTRICT TO Do?
Many school districts are concerned about the level of drugs

112. One could easily argue that schools do just that today. The problem is that
public schools should only play one part in a student's life. Other skill sets are learned
in the home, through interaction with other facets of government, and in church and
non-school related extracurricular activities.
113. Schools could also spin off athletic programs, turning them over to city or private leagues. Schools, meanwhile, could use the money they save on classroom materials, teacher salaries, or even to retire school bonds early.
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and their ability to help prevent students from harming themselves with drugs; consequently, the following ~uiding princi11
ples may help school districts formulate a plan.
First, conduct an assessment. Determine whether there
really is a drug problem in the school district. This may help
school districts determine what sorts of remedies are necessary
for their own individual situations. Use a survey or other scientific means to discover what percentages of students in the
school district are using drugs and the type of drugs that are
being used. Attempt to determine whether a correlation exists
between levels of drug usage and the types of activities students are participating in. During the assessment, make sure
that the five Vernonia factors are appropriately answered:
• What is the nature of the privacy interest?
• What will be the character of the intrusion?
• What is the nature of the government's concern?
• What is the immediacy of the government's concern?
• What is the efficacy of the means?
Second, during the period where an assessment is being
made, use what courts normally describe as "less intrusive
means" to fight the drug problem by providing seminars, required workshops, classes, videos, and other sorts of training to
warn students and their parents from using drugs and alcohol.
See what effect this has on the level of drug usage in the
school, or in the school district. Develop a file of anecdotal material and stories where students became involved with drugs
and the tragedies that befell them.
Third, if random drug testing is determined to be necessary,
focus on the group of students who are most "at risk" of damaging their health and welfare. Have a meeting with the parents
of the students and, prior to implementation of the policy, receive their input and suggestions. Parents seem to be concerned about the safety of their children and frequently go
along with good faith efforts of schools to help children.
The following factors should be considered when developing
a plan:

114. This should be taken as a specific plan. This section's purpose is to highlight
the underlying considerations that should go into the determination of how to proceed
with developing a plan. Two law review articles that offer excellent nuts and bolts specifics on planning procedures are: Bursch, supra note 50 (providing a model resolution
for a school drug testing policy) and Russo & Gregory, supra note 1. Also consider Justice O'Connor's dissent in Vernonia.
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• Narrowly tailor the number or type of students you are
drug testing (i.e. athletes and cheerleaders).
• Have both students and parents sign permission forms.
• Regulate substances that will easily pass muster like illegal drugs and alcohol.
• Ensure that there is a legitimate written procedure for
who is selected, how they are tested, and how the results for positive drug tests will be handled.
• Try to work with established services that have already
done this sort of thing so as to create an air of objectivity and a scientific basis for the project.
V. CONCLUSION

In spite of the dangers and harms faced by students who
use drugs, it is possible for school districts to utilize means that
rely upon a suspicion-based level rather than merely resorting
to random suspicionless drug testing. Certainly, situations may
exist where it appears that the most drastic means possible are
necessary to combat this problem. It should be remembered,
though, that students are also people who have constitutional
rights that the government may not violate.
Jon Eskelsen

